U.S.-Israeli Strikes on Iran: Will They Reshape the Middle East Order?

By Yosuke Yamazaki, Journalist

From the Spring Issue of the electronic “Salaam Quarterly Bulletin”, No.57, May 2026

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The United States and Israel launched a large scale attack on Iran’s leadership core on February 28, known as Operation Epic Fury, delivering devastating blows to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the country’s military infrastructure. Driven into a corner, Iran responded by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz, sending crude oil prices soaring and putting the global economy under significant strain. As the militarily superior United States imposed a “reverse blockade” to intensify pressure, attention has turned to the prospects for ceasefire negotiations.

Massive U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iranian territory

According to the Trump administration, the massive U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iranian territory inflicted catastrophic damage on Iran’s air defense network as well as its air and naval forces. After the operation began, U.S. forces conducted an extensive air campaign, carrying out more than 13,000 combat sorties. The strikes focused on Iran’s military nerve centers—command and control facilities, missile bases, underground production sites, air defense radars, and communication nodes—destroying over 12,300 targets.
As a result, Iran’s ballistic missile launch capability and missile production lines have suffered long term degradation, severely limiting its strategic strike capacity. At sea, the number of Iranian vessels destroyed has exceeded 155. U.S. casualties have been limited, with 13 deaths reported (7 in combat and 6 non combat).
On the Iranian side, Supreme Leader Khamenei and many senior officials were killed. Mojtaba Khamenei, selected as Iran’s new Supreme Leader, has not appeared in public or released any audio statements since his appointment, prompting speculation that he may have been injured or killed.

Three Massive Craters at the “Taleghan Nuclear Facility

In response to the U.S.-Israeli attacks, Iran launched retaliatory strikes on U.S. bases in the Middle East and on Israel and further carried out an effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of the world’s crude oil and LNG shipments pass. Crude prices surged, briefly exceeding $119 per barrel, and the global economy has come under significant strain.
According to accounts of the decision making process, President Trump was motivated by concerns about preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and about its long range missile capabilities. However, U.S. intelligence agencies had not concluded that Iran was producing nuclear weapons, and they assessed that Iran’s missile forces were not yet capable of threatening the U.S. mainland. This has led to criticism that “no imminent threat existed.” Even so, Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium had reached a record 440 kilograms, a quantity that experts say could be further enriched via centrifuges to produce multiple nuclear bombs in a short period. While an immediate weapons program was not confirmed, the country’s nuclear capabilities were approaching a dangerous threshold, and the Trump administration is believed to have judged that it was necessary to pre empt future risks.

Another factor said to have influenced the decision was Iran’s weakening position both militarily and politically. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had lost influence due to sanctions and financial shortages, while proxy groups such as Hezbollah and Iraqi militias had seen their activities slow. Domestically, anti government protests were expanding amid economic deterioration, undermining the regime’s governing capacity and legitimacy. With these external and internal pressures converging, U.S. officials appear to have viewed the moment as an opportunity to constrain Iran’s military capabilities and reshape the regional order.
Faced with the overwhelming military superiority of the United States and Israel, Iran adopted an asymmetric strategy designed to offset the advantages of a stronger adversary. Rather than physically closing the Strait of Hormuz, Iran created an environment in which navigation became effectively impossible by signaling the threat of missile and drone attacks. As a result, the strait entered a state of de facto closure.
Iran’s objective is to draw the conflict into a prolonged war of attrition. By driving up crude oil prices and increasing the financial burden of the conflict, Tehran aims to stir anti war sentiment within the United States ahead of the November midterm elections and thereby push Washington toward a ceasefire on terms more favorable to Iran.

Ceasefire Efforts Amid Ongoing Military and Economic Pressure

By late March, moves toward exploring a ceasefire began to surface. As criticism mounted at home and abroad over soaring oil prices, President Trump warned on March 21 that the United States would “strike Iran’s power plants unless the Strait of Hormuz is opened within 48 hours.” Iran responded that any attack would trigger retaliatory strikes on U.S.-related facilities, raising fears of further military escalation.
Meanwhile, the U.S. news site Axios reported the same day that the Trump administration had begun probing the possibility of peace talks with Iran. Egypt, Qatar, and the United Kingdom were acting as intermediaries, conveying messages between the two sides. According to the report, Iran expressed openness to negotiations but demanded guarantees against a resumption of hostilities and sought compensation. The U.S. side, for its part, was said to be preparing to demand a complete halt to uranium enrichment, a five year freeze on missile development, the dismantlement of three nuclear facilities including Natanz, and an end to funding for pro Iranian groups in the Middle East.
Amid these developments, President Trump announced on March 23 via social media that two days of talks aimed at ending the war had taken place with Iran, describing them as “very good and productive.” Two days earlier, he had issued the 48 hour ultimatum regarding the Strait of Hormuz, but he stated that the deadline would be extended by five days. Speaking to reporters in Florida, Trump explained that Middle East envoy Steven Witkoff and others were conducting negotiations and had made contact with the Iranian side on March 22.
Sensing progress in behind the scenes negotiations, President Trump announced on March 26 that the suspension of U.S. strikes on Iran’s energy related facilities would be extended for an additional ten days. He stated that talks with Iran were “ongoing and going very well.” Trump also said that Iran had offered a “gift,” revealing that ten oil tankers had been allowed to transit the Strait of Hormuz.
After Trump extended the negotiation deadline from April 6 by one day, a key moment arrived on April 7. He declared that the United States would halt bombing and other attacks on Iran for two weeks on the condition that Iran “fully and immediately reopen the Strait of Hormuz in a safe manner.” Iran, for its part, indicated that it would suspend military operations if attacks on its territory ceased, resulting in a temporary ceasefire.
Subsequently, the first round of peace talks was held in Pakistan on April 11 and 12. The negotiations stretched over an extraordinary twenty hours but ended without agreement. The U.S. delegation was led by Vice President J.D. Vance, while the Iranian delegation was headed by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Ghalibaf. The two sides reportedly held intensive discussions on core issues including Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, frozen assets, and the management of the Strait of Hormuz.
According to Israel’s major television network Channel 12, the U.S. demands toward Iran included the dismantling of its nuclear capabilities, the transfer of enriched uranium to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the closure of three key nuclear facilities such as Natanz, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and limits on Iran’s missile stockpile. In return, Washington was said to be considering support for Iran’s civilian nuclear power program and the lifting of sanctions.

U.S. “Reverse Blockade” and Signs of Internal Division in Iran

Even after the ceasefire, Iran’s de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz continued. On April 12, President Trump ordered a “reverse blockade” of all Iranian ports. Beginning on April 13, U.S. Central Command initiated a naval blockade in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, restricting the movement of vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports. With the United States effectively taking control of maritime traffic through the strait, Iran faced a sharp escalation of economic and military pressure as its crude-oil exports—and thus its foreign-currency revenues—were brought to a halt.

Amid these developments, on April 17 Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi announced that the Strait of Hormuz had been “fully reopened,” stating that commercial vessels would be allowed to transit designated routes following the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. However, on the same day, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Ghalibaf declared that “the strait will not be open as long as the United States maintains its blockade,” and media outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps also rejected the foreign minister’s statement. The episode exposed a rift between the Foreign Ministry and the Revolutionary Guard, underscoring internal divisions within Iran.
Meanwhile, President Trump asserted that Iran had “agreed to return nuclear material,” suggesting that negotiations were making progress, though Iranian officials have publicly denied this. Both sides appear to be using information strategically to strengthen their positions in the ceasefire talks.
While welcoming the reopening of the strait, Trump emphasized that the naval blockade of Iranian ports would “remain in place until a peace agreement is reached.” The United States has set April 22 as the deadline for the ceasefire negotiations and has presented Iran with a comprehensive set of demands, including the abandonment of its nuclear and missile programs and the reopening of the strait. Iran, for its part, continues to pursue a long-term war of attrition aimed at extracting concessions from Washington. If the Pakistan-mediated talks fail to make progress, tensions could rise again after the ceasefire deadline.

U.S. Pressure on China’s Military Support for Iran

The Trump administration’s “reverse blockade” also exerted pressure on China, Iran’s principal supporter. China relies on imports for 70 percent of its crude‑oil consumption, with roughly half of those imports coming from the Middle East. Concerned that a prolonged closure of the strait could undermine its energy security, the Chinese government on April 15 urged Iran—for the first time—to normalize maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The move was widely seen as reflecting Beijing’s growing anxiety over securing stable oil supplies.
That same day, President Trump revealed that he had sent a letter to President Xi, requesting that China refrain from supplying weapons to Iran. On social media, Trump claimed that Xi had agreed, though Chinese officials denied that any such transfers were taking place. Washington’s warnings to Beijing came amid a series of reports suggesting Chinese involvement in enhancing Iran’s missile and drone capabilities.
On April 11, CNN reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had detected preparations by China to supply Iran with new air-defense systems, including man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), with indications that the equipment would be routed through third countries. The report also suggested that Iran might be using the ceasefire period to replenish its weapons stockpiles.
Further, the Financial Times reported on April 14 that Iran had used a Chinese-made high-resolution satellite, the TEE-01B, to assess damage following its attack on a U.S. airbase in Saudi Arabia. Satellite imagery showed that the TEE-01B conducted repeated passes over the Prince Sultan Air Base between March 13 and 15, coinciding with the timing of the attack. The report highlighted the possibility that Chinese military technology was contributing to Iran’s offensive capabilities.

President Trump has signaled his intention to sever China’s longstanding military influence over Iran. These developments underscore that the current operation extends beyond a bilateral confrontation with Iran and is situated within the broader strategic competition between the United States and China.

Rebuilding the Anti-Iran Containment Network and Reshaping the Middle East Order

During its first term, the Trump administration withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and reinstated its “maximum pressure” policy, imposing sweeping restrictions on Iran’s oil exports, financial transactions, and maritime activities. At the same time, Washington strengthened ties with Israel, moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem and brokering the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain. These steps institutionalized a shared anti-Iran alignment between Israel and the Gulf states.
After returning to the presidency last year, President Trump visited Saudi Arabia and the UAE, reaffirming enhanced security cooperation. He also moved to improve relations with the new Syrian government formed after the collapse of the Assad regime, supporting its efforts to curb the influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah. As a result, Iran’s proxy network weakened in Syria and Lebanon, significantly improving Israel’s security environment.
This Iran strategy reflects not only an effort to stabilize the region but also a broader geopolitical aim: freeing U.S. strategic resources for the Indo-Pacific. Iran’s missile capabilities and proxy forces have long been a persistent source of instability in the Middle East, tying down U.S. military assets. If Iran’s threat is contained, the United States can reduce its permanent military presence in the region and focus more fully on its long-term strategy toward China, its primary strategic competitor.
Moreover, a more stable Middle East would support regional integration initiatives such as the India-Europe-Middle East Economic Corridor and the Middle East Digital Corridor, contributing to the creation of a new economic zone linking the Indo-Pacific and Europe. These projects function as alternative routes to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and form part of Washington’s broader strategy toward Beijing.
Given this broader strategic context, the future trajectory of U.S.-Iran negotiations will be a critical issue—not only for Middle Eastern stability but also for the United States’ overall strategy toward China.(April 17,2026)

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